FanPost

The Cavs Must Force the Warriors to Play Their Weakest Brand of Basketball

To many, the Warriors appeared weakest during their Game 5 98-94 loss to the Rockets in the Western Conference Finals. They were having an "identity crisis," relying heavily on isolation. Kevin Durant gave zero assists and shot 8/22 in traffic (29 points). Stephen Curry shot 2/8 from three-point range. Draymond Green turned the ball over six times. This team, which averaged a pace of 102.5 possessions per game, found themselves with only 92 that night. This is the Warriors' debacle ball.

Perhaps debacle is too strong a word. At the very least, this brand of Warriors basketball is beatable against an isolation-first, star-reliant offense like the Rockets’. The Cavs could play a similar type of basketball—sure, they don’t have the deadly shooters Harden does, but LeBron is LeBron, and maybe he and some grinders like Tristan Thompson, George Hill, and Jeff Green (when he wants to be) could push a potentially dysfunctional Warriors team. Think 2015. The Cavs fell short then, but those Cavs also didn’t have Kevin Love available as another scoring option. There’s precedent that the Cavs could win if Love puts up 19 points, 4 assists, and 3 rebounds. He could even go 5/21 (23.8%) from the field and 0/11 from beyond the arc. After all, that’s what MVP-favorite Harden put up in the game 5 win.

Like Game 5, Game 4 was a similar grind-it-out 95-92 win for Houston. These two games together sparked conversations over the Warriors weakness. The Wall Street Journal reported on the stunted Golden State offense in crunch time, citing only 12 fourth quarter points in Game 4 and only one field goal in the last five minutes of Game 5. The Warriors’ well-greased machine was jammed. Running only 6.9 isolation plays per game in the regular season, they were running 23.2 per game in that series after Game 5. They were passing less in general. Coach Steve Kerr said his goal is for the Dubs to pass 300 times per game. In their Game 1 119-106 victory over the Rockets, they passed 283 times. In their Game 4 loss, they passed 269 times; in Game 5, only 257 times.

Game 4 did require solid performances from Houston’s high-powered backcourt. Paul shot 10/20 (50%) from the field and 5/9 (55.6%) from three for 27 points, giving out four assists but on three turnovers. Harden supplied 30 points and 3 steals, but he shot 11/26 (42.3%) from the field and 3/12 (25%) from three.

In Game 5’s win, the stars were not as impressive. Harden not only scored just 19 points with bad efficiency, but he coughed the ball up six times. Paul fared a bit better: he went 6/19 (31.6%) from the field for 20 points, but he gave out six assists with no turnovers and stole the ball three times.

So, it would seem that it’s possible to beat the Warriors without historic production on the offensive end. The answer to slowing down Golden State is on the defensive side. To have a chance against them, you must do three things: 1) Force them to become stagnant on offense. 2) Force them to get sloppy and commit turnovers. 3) Limit fastbreak points.

The Warriors become stagnant on offense when they’re lured into picking on the mismatch, oftentimes with Durant. He isolates his matchup, whether that be Paul who he can manhandle or PJ Tucker who he can attempt to blow by. But while he’s isolating, the other four defenders are set and ready to help, only a call away. The Rockets invite these isolation looks by volunteering to switch everything, regardless of what matchup they’re left with. They’d probably rather have Paul on Curry, but if he finds himself elsewhere, that’s okay. By switching everything, the Rockets limit the Warriors’ off-ball screening strategies, by always having someone connected to a deadly shooter. Without open opportunities with easy passes, their offense can revert to choosing to attack Durant’s man—which, really isn’t a bad strategy; he may very well be the best isolation player in basketball—but the constant employment of it bogs down the Golden State machine. Durant can end up forcing his shot and clever help defense like the Rockets used can smother him into bad shooting and passing numbers.

The Cavs need to hope all their players are ready to defend if they want to use this successful switching strategy, but they’ll especially be pulling for George Hill. Though Paul stands at a similar stature, he is skilled at disrupting the dribbler and forcing turnovers. Durant appeared uncomfortable at times against Paul because, though a competent ballhandler, Durant’s 6’10 frame forces him to have a big dribble. Hill can be a plus defender, although his best days are almost certainly behind him in Indiana. If Hill can be fearless against Durant and try to disrupt his rhythm and ability to get to where he wants on the floor, help defense from the likes of Thompson, Green, and James will be that much easier to deploy.

Golden State dazzles in a multitude of ways, but they are still a turnover-plagued team. Houston looked to maximize the amount of mistakes the defending champs would make by playing ultra physical defense against them, picking up ballhandlers just past the half-court line. Without Iguodala as a secondary and confident ballhandler next to Curry, Draymond Green and KD struggled to fulfill the same role with defenders like Paul and Trevor Ariza all up on them. Iggy is more confident than Green and Durant at parking up in the back wing with his dribble as plays develop in front of him. In Golden State’s losses, they averaged 16.3 turnovers; in their wins, they averaged 11.5.

Cleveland needs to play just as physically to force these turnovers. However, with an older squad, which depends on less talented, less physical defenders like Kevin Love, this will be a tough task. Because of this, the Cavs should experiment with adding Love to the second unit. Of course, the Love-at-the-five lineups have yielded fantastic offensive results, but I believe it is physical, switchable defense which beats the Warriors, not high-powered, star-studded offense. Plus, because LeBron will likely be playing more than 40 minutes per game this series, there will be plenty of opportunity to use the Love-at-center lineup. Still, I think Love’s minutes should be lessened, but he should be made a priority whenever Durant is off the floor. With Durant on the floor, the Warriors are most able to exploit the Love matchup, which, even with help a call away, has proven to be a very advantageous situation for the Warriors. With Durant and Green on the floor, Golden State possesses two guys who have consistently given Love problems in the post and rendered him a non-factor in games.

Kevin Love should still be utilized; he’s a constant threat for 20 points and 10 rebounds, but I think he has a better chance of realizing this threat in the second unit. Thompson has the ability to snatch rebounds, play physically in the post, and guard out on the perimeter and Jeff Green has a better chance of slowing down and bodying up the Warriors’ stars on the other side. The Cavs must allow themselves the capacity to play physically to disrupt the Warriors, especially while Iguodala is out for the beginning of the series. In starting Jeff Green over Love, the Cavs give themselves an opportunity to force careless Golden State turnovers while forcing them to also slow down Love with players like Looney, Young, and Curry rather than their premier defenders.

Lastly, the Rockets limited the Warriors’ fastbreak points in Games 4 and 5. In those losses, the Warriors only averaged 10 fastbreak points; in every other game, they averaged 17.4. If you take away Houston’s one blowout 127-105 win in Game 2, this number swells to 20. The Rockets were energetic and focused in the games they forced the Warriors into debacle ball; even Harden looked less like a laughable shaqtin’-a-fool hall of shamer and more like an average defender. They did not fall asleep after makes or misses and kept the Warriors in front of them, making them run more sets without Iguodala as a secondary ball handler and mismatch lures for Durant.

Unfortunately, the Cavs can often look lethargic in games. They’re stocked with veterans passed their prime and a morale that finds itself in quicksand if they get dealt paralyzing blows and an early deficit. Funnily enough though, playing the 37-year-old Kyle Korver may keep Cleveland’s energy up. In both the Toronto and Boston series, he’s played persistent defense and made hustle plays, diving for loose balls and getting back into defensive rotations. The Warriors’ elite offensive talent might easily neutralize Korver’s defensive hustle, and his 3-point shooting might go dormant when chased around my Klay Thompson, but he’s worth a try. He might just get the Cavs to run back on defense. A big part of limiting Golden State’s fastbreak points may depend on the sharpshooter’s intangibles.

While Cleveland may not have much of a chance of winning these NBA Finals, the blueprint to weakening the Warriors’ potency was laid out by Houston in their Games 4 and 5 slugfests. 2015 proved that LeBron could win a couple games off an elite, ball-moving offense while surrounded by a short rotation of scrubs. The Warriors were, of course, without Kevin Durant at that point.

Still, there was just something about that Houston series that made the Warriors seem—I don’t know—beatable. They aren’t the 16-1 team from 2017. They are a team who underwent a major identity crisis midway through the Western Conference Finals and surrendered both a home court advantage and a 3-2 lead going into Games 6 and 7 against a team newly without its second best player. But if Cleveland’s going to make this series competitive, they’ve got to emulate Houston’s defense with their less capable personnel.

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All stats from basketball reference.

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